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David Hume and Simone de Beauvoir agree that human beings have a 
great deal of control over their moral and political lives, which is well captured 
in Hume’s assertion that “mankind is an inventive species”. But Hume argues 
that the most important thing needed to settle our social lives and determine 
justice is the agreement on rules of property, while Beauvoir thinks that the 
rules of property will never be enough to establish the best life, but rather 
that we should be focusing on freedom. In this article we reconstruct Hume’s 
argument for property, then develop a Beauvoirian critique of Hume that brings 
out the weakness of any theory of property that does not prevent inequalities 
of property from interfering with freedom. And then we give the last word to 
a Humean response to Beauvoir that would insist that there can be no freedom 
but only violence without rules of property, which she ignores. Both thinkers 
appeal to humanity as an overriding goal, and perhaps that is the way to 
reconcile the two: we need both property and freedom to achieve our humanity.
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Resumen
David Hume y Simone de Beauvoir están de acuerdo en que los seres humanos 
tienen un grado muy importante de control sobre sus vidas morales y políticas; 
lo que está muy bien captado en la afirmación de Hume de que “la humanidad 
es una especie inventiva”. Pero Hume argumenta que lo más importante a la 
hora de constituir nuestras vidas sociales y establecer la justicia es el acuerdo 
sobre las reglas de la propiedad, mientras que Beauvoir piensa que las reglas de 
propiedad nunca serán suficientes para establecer la vida mejor, sino que más bien 
deberíamos centrarnos en la libertad. En este artículo reconstruimos el argumento 
de Hume a favor de la propiedad, para desarrollar después una crítica basada en la 
perspectiva de Simone de Beauvoir que saca a la luz la debilidad de cualquier teoría 
de la propiedad que no evite que las desigualdades de propiedad interfieran con la 
libertad, Y después damos la última palabra a una respuesta humeana a Beauvoir 
que insistiría en que no puede haber libertad –sino solo violencia- sin reglas de 
propiedad, algo que ella ignora. Ambos pensadores recurren a la humanidad como 
el objetivo predominante, y quizás esta es la forma de reconciliarlos: necesitamos 
tanto de la propiedad como de la libertad para lograr nuestra humanidad.
Palabras-clave: David Hume, Simone de Beauvoir, propiedad, libertad, 
humanidad.
“Mankind is an inventive species”, wrote David Hume in 1740, and went 
on to explain what he thought mankind had invented in matters of justice. Selfish 
acquisitive passions were so strong, he argued, that they can only be controlled 
by redirecting the same passions to support the rules of property. But is that 
enough for justice? Simone de Beauvoir, writing two centuries later, developed 
what can be understood as a critique of Hume’s theory of justice as property 
via a critique of the actual status of the oppressed and of women in prevailing 
regimes of property in much of history and in her time. Her point is well taken 
that rules of property without any attention to equality of some sort among 
property holders will probably not achieve anything recognizable as justice. 
But her emphasis in her earlier philosophical writings on freedom without any 
recognition of the role of property in supporting such freedom leaves her open 
to a Humean critique. To the extent that she pays more attention to property 
in her magnum opus, The Second Sex (1949), that critique is mitigated, but it 
may still be said that her emphasis on freedom without an equal emphasis on 
property leaves the Humean critique with some traction.  
Our argument will take the following steps: first, we will outline Hume’s 
theory of justice as expressed in A Treatise of Human Nature. Then we will 
review some of Beauvoir’s earlier works as well as her theory of ethics in 
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), and their alternative to and implicit critique 
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of Hume’s theory. Then we will bring in some materials from The Second 
Sex to show that by then she had realized the practical importance of property 
rights in the liberation of women. Finally, we will give the floor back to a 
Humean critique of Beauvoir’s theory. We can hope that what will emerge will 
be a productive debate that clarifies the conceptual issues in service of a better 
understanding of property, freedom, and justice.   
1. Hume’s theory of justice as rules of property
At the age of 29, David Hume published the third volume of A Treatise 
of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Titled “Of Morals”, Book III of the Treatise 
is only 103 pages long in the Oxford edition from 2000.3 Yet it is packed 
with remarkable arguments and claims. As a note on method, we shall be 
concentrating here on this one book by Hume. Naturally, it should be read in 
the context of the ideas he had developed in volumes one and two. But since he 
noted at the beginning of the book that it was “in some measure independent of 
the other two, and requires not that the reader shou’d enter into all the abstract 
reasonings contain’d in them” (292), we are going to take that as license to 
concentrate mainly on this text. It would also be useful to cast our net forward 
in his writings to see how his ideas in this book were taken up or changed in 
his later writings, but we do not have the space for that, and we want to achieve 
the clarity that is possible by focusing on one set of ideas at one point in time.4 
It is appropriate to start with Hume’s assertion that “mankind is an 
inventive species” (311). Aristotle had argued that mankind is a political 
animal, and Edmund Burke was later to argue that it is a religious species, but 
Hume’s emphasis is on the inventiveness of humanity. We are what we make of 
ourselves. We are not predetermined by nature or a divinity, in his analysis. And 
the most important area of our inventiveness is that of morals.
Philosophers and others who believe that they reason well like to think 
that moral ideas are a matter of reasoning and rationality. But Hume begins 
volume three with the argument that moral distinctions are not derived from 
reason (293). That may be a good thing, considering that if they did depend 
on reasoning, and how little reasoning most people have been (and still 
are) capable of, there would not have been much moral behavior in human 
3  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David and Mary Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). Hereafter cited in the text by page number in parentheses.
4  On developments in his theory of justice, see Annette Baier, The Cautious Jealous Virtue: Hume 
on Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). Hereafter cited in the text by page number 
in parentheses. She asserts that his later study of history taught Hume that “doing justice to each other 
comprises a lot more than respecting each other’s property rights” (16-17). We shall see if that is true.  
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history. But according to Hume the problem is that reason cannot make us 
want something, or love it or hate it. It is limited to the discovery of truth or 
falsehood (295), which cannot by itself make us want something. It may be 
true that it is “acknowledged by all mankind” that it is wrong to kill your own 
parents, but he insists that this prohibition is not a matter of fact or reason 
(300). Left alone, nature allows trees to kill their parents by growing up and 
putting them in the shade (300). So if we all feel that there is something wrong 
with killing your parents it is not a matter of fact or reason, he asserts, but of 
passions that are inculcated by nurture and become a feeling or moral sense. 
Similarly, murder by itself is just a fact, which can only be given a value by 
what Hume calls a “sentiment of disapprobation”, not by reason (301). Hume 
proceeds to spell out what it means to say that moral distinctions are the product 
of a moral sense (302). This sense is natural in the sense that every nation has 
some sense of morals (305), but not in the sense that there is one set of possible 
moral distinctions set by nature. If nature is opposed to artifice, then it begins 
to look like moral distinctions may often belong to the latter (305). And Part 2 
of Hume’s book makes the case that justice is an artificial virtue.
Justice cannot be based on love of our neighbors, in Hume’s view. “There 
is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such” 
(309). Instead, we have to invent rules that will serve as a substitute for it. He 
insists that “when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, 
natural, only as oppos’d to artificial. In another sense of the word; …no virtue 
is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species; and where an 
invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may properly be said to be 
natural as anything that proceeds immediately from original principles, without 
the intervention of thought or reflection” (311). Thus we are required by our 
condition to invent something that will serve the purposes of justice. 
The need for justice is created by our partiality towards ourselves and 
our relations. There is no “inartificial principle of the human mind” (313) 
to counteract it. Rather, “our natural uncultivated ideas of morality… rather 
conform themselves to that partiality” (314). Fortunately, “nature provides a 
remedy in the judgment and understanding” once we realize that “the principal 
disturbance in society arises from those goods, which we call external”, that is, 
property (314). That can only be done, Hume says, “by a convention enter’d 
into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of 
those external goods” (314). This convention is not a promise, but “a general 
sense of common interest” (314-5).
Hume situates property in juxtaposition to justice: “The same artifice gives 
rise to both” (315). In fact, it seems to be the main element of justice. He insists 
that “no one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and 
for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the 
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establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and 
observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling 
a perfect harmony and concord” (315-6). This is an astonishing claim. Is justice 
really all about property? That is Hume’s claim, and maybe he is right. If we 
object that there are crimes of passion such as rape or murder, presumably the 
answer would be that most of them are really about property in some form 
or other. In any case, he asserts, “all other passions, besides this of interest, 
are easily restrain’d, or are not of such pernicious consequence” (316). “This 
avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions… is insatiable, perpetual, 
universal, and directly destructive of society” (316). This is another astonishing 
claim. Our desire for property is so pernicious? That is also Hume’s claim, and 
maybe he is right.
If we have not thought about it much, we might be surprised to hear that 
property is such a fundamental element of justice. We may think fairness or 
reciprocity or equality are the important elements. But that may be because 
we take the rules of property so much for granted that we cannot even imagine 
what life would be like without them. What is at stake here is not whether or not 
we have fair, or only partly fair, or unfair rules of property. Hume’s insight is 
that the rules of property are fundamental to any system that controls the natural 
violence of human beings. It would be an interesting intellectual exercise to 
rewrite any standard work on justice, such as Michael Sandel’s Justice: What’s 
the Right Thing to Do?, with an eye to bringing out the importance of property 
rules in every aspect of the determination of justice.5 It may turn out to be a 
more profound and thorough account of justice. 
Fortunately, this dangerous passion can be manipulated to control itself. 
Hume argues that no other “affection of the human mind has both a sufficient 
force, and a proper direction to counter-balance the love of gain” (316). “There 
is no passion therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the 
very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction” (316). Luckily, “upon the 
least reflection… ‘tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy’d by its 
restraint” (316). This is what is known as enlightened self-interest. Thus, by 
following the rules of property and “preserving society we make much greater 
advances in the acquiring possessions, than by running into the solitary and 
forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal license” 
(316). 
Hume rejects the idea that justice is founded on reason and is universal 
and obligatory (318). If it were, we would hardly have to think about it. Rather, 
it is based on artifice and human conventions (319). We have the theme of 
inventiveness again: “men invented the three fundamental laws of nature” 
5  Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York, Farrar, Straus, 2009).
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and “self-love… is the first motive of their observance” (348).6 It is also the 
original motive for the rules of justice: “‘Tis self-love which is their real origin” 
(339). But then we come to understand their general benefit: “sympathy with 
the public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that 
virtue” (320-21). And the beneficiaries do their best to cultivate that sympathy: 
this “progress of the sentiments” is natural, but also promoted by the “artifice 
of politicians” (321). They “teach us that we can better satisfy our appetites in 
an oblique and artificial manner, than by their headlong and impetuous motion” 
(334). Our “governors and rulers… being satisfy’d with their present condition, 
and with their part in society, have an immediate interest in every execution of 
justice, which is so necessary to the upholding of society” (344). Hobbes would 
say there can be no such satisfaction because no one is ever satisfied with their 
wealth and power but always needs more. And of course we could begin our 
critique with pointing out that even rulers can have an interest in injustices that 
favor them.  
Property rights affect the other aspects of our life: “There is nothing 
that touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our 
reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of 
others” (321). Yet they are only general rules. Justice does not try to assign 
particular goods to particular persons, because such decisions would be “liable 
to so many controversies” (322). Property rules are all based on the imagination 
and subject to change (324-7, with long note on the imagination, 327-9). In 
case anyone thinks that this is too arbitrary and contingent for something as 
important as justice, Hume insists that this is the case for all social values: “all 
morality depends upon our sentiments” (332).
Hume does not start from a high opinion of human nature. He believes 
that “men are, in a great measure, govern’d by interest” (342). And they prefer 
trivial present advantage to substantial future advantage (343). We have a 
“violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote” (344). So we learn to set up 
government to control ourselves by overriding the present interest in favor of 
the future (344). Government may have begun by consent, but “as soon as the 
advantages of government are fully known and acknowledg’d, it immediately 
takes root of itself, and has an original obligation and authority, independent 
of all contracts” (347). Paradoxically, although governments start with a 
convention, afterward “we naturally suppose ourselves born to submission” 
(355). So, rights can be created by nothing more than the passage of time. 
Leaders know that “time alone gives solidity to their right; and operating 
gradually on the minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and makes 
6  Although Hume often uses the words “mankind” and “human”, he also uses the word “men” 
in contexts in which he clearly means all humans. Simone de Beauvoir also uses the word “man” 
[l’homme] when she means mankind. Later generations of feminists have disputed that practice, but 
we here adopt the practice of our two authors when quoting and commenting on their texts.
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it seem just and reasonable. Nothing causes any sentiment to have a greater 
influence upon us than custom” (356).7 “Time and custom give authority to all 
forms of government, and all successions of princes; and that power, which 
at first was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and 
obligatory” (362). Justice, the laws of nations, and virtues such as modesty 
are “human contrivances for the interest of society. The inventors of them had 
chiefly in view their own interest. But we carry our approbation of them into 
the most distant countries and ages, and much beyond our own interest” (369). 
Hume’s only comment on the status of women in Book III is a discussion 
of what he calls the paradox of the rule about women’s chastity, which is that 
it applies after menopause and thus when no longer necessary (365-6). He is 
not critical of the rule: he does not recognize that some men have raised other 
men’s children, and that humans could invent a system in which many did. 
Sheridan Hough compares the ways in which Hume and Nietzsche discuss the 
artifice of female comportment. She argues that for Hume “the importance of 
chastity turns on a psychological claim about men.”8 This claim “really does 
demand a kind of genealogical analysis. Why is it a universal and necessary 
fact that men need reassurances about paternity?”9 In fact, she points to another 
passage in Hume in which he seems to reject this very idea.10 It is true that, like 
Jeffrey Church suggests, according to Hume, social artifices “can only guide 
and assist our natural propensity to approve of agreeable or useful behavior and 
to disapprove of disagreeable or harmful behavior.”11 However, Hume does 
not prove that the desire for men to be assured of a child’s paternity is actually 
natural. But perhaps more important, he does not explore the status of women 
in regimes of rules of property. He does not mention the point that women 
have often not been allowed to own property, and have even been considered 
property. So we do not know what his view of the place of women in justice is 
from this text.
Hume’s conclusion is that “Tho’ justice be artificial, the sense of its 
morality is natural” (395). He recognizes that “most of the inventions of men 
are subject to change. They depend upon humor and caprice. They have a vogue 
in time, and then sink into oblivion” (395), but “the interest, on which justice 
is founded, is the greatest imaginable, and extends to all times and places. It 
7  For more on Hume’s understanding of custom, see John Christian Laursen, “David Hume on 
custom and habit and living with skepticism”, Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 52, 2011, 
87-99.
8  Sheridan Hough, “Humean Androgynes and the Nature of ‘Nature’” in Feminist Interpretations 
of David Hume, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 
220.
9  Hough, “Human Androgynes…”, 228.
10  Hough notes that Hume takes this position in “On Polygamy and Divorce” (“Human 
Androgynes…”, 228),
11  Jeffrey Church, “Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the 
Modern State”, The Journal of Politics, 69, 2007, 171.
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cannot possibly be serv’d by any other invention… All these causes render the 
rules of justice stedfast and immutable; at least, as immutable as human nature” 
(395). If a “Treatise of Human Nature” is going to capture the basic feature of 
human nature, it must focus on property as the basic element of justice.
Hume’s argument is clearly abstract and philosophical. It does not trace any 
particulars of the history of property. It is conjectural history, and foreshadows 
his later use of “natural history”, which is to say, a speculative presentation 
of the principles that must have underlain some development. Although his 
sketch of the rules of property from occupation to prescription to accession 
and succession obviously tracks Roman law, it is not presented as such but 
as a deduction from human needs and utility. One of the consequences of this 
method of reviewing the history of property is that he does not bring up the 
problems that any particular set of rules of property can cause nor discuss how 
to prevent them.    
Note that Hume’s abstract discussion of property does not take a stand on 
whether the property that determines so much of justice exists within a regime 
that permits private property in the means of production, or one that does not. 
Most socialist or communist regimes have permitted and regulated personal 
property, and have certainly defended and protected the property rights of the 
commune or state in the means of production. 
There are reasons for thinking that the rules of property may be the most 
realistic way of controlling greed and violence. Knowing who is authorized 
to do what with what things and pieces of land helps us solve problems of 
coexistence and coordination. The invention of property in the service 
of enlightened self-interest may have been one of the most revolutionary 
developments in the inventive history of the species. Referring to Hume, one 
scholar once wrote that “to see justice this way, as an unintended consequence 
of individual human actions, must be one of the boldest moves in the history 
of the philosophy of law”.12 But is it enough, and is it complete? Hume seems 
to be somewhat complacent: once the rules of property are established, is it 
really the case that “there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling 
a perfect harmony and concord”? (315-6). 
2. Simone de Beauvoir’s alternative
According to Simone de Beauvoir, freedom is the most important part 
of the human condition. Whether one is oppressed or the oppressor, one is 
always free. However, these freedoms are not equal. Because different people’s 
freedoms are not always equal, and because, according to Beauvoir, one 
12  Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 20.
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person’s freedom is dependent on the freedom of others, it is necessary and 
beneficial for individuals to attempt to further their freedom and the freedom 
of others.
This is not an idealist argument which ignores the harsh limitations of 
the world. Her philosophy for an ethics of action and creation of meaning 
in the world is actually dependent on the existence of limitations. However, 
as Beauvoir makes clear in her 1945 essay, “Moral Idealism and Political 
Realism”, one also must not get bogged down in the facts of the world and view 
them as being set in stone. Both pure moral idealism and pure political realism 
have the potential to lead to inaction or man’s denial of his own freedom. In 
both moral idealism and political realism the individual attaches himself to a 
value or principle and rejects what Beauvoir believes ethics necessitates. She 
writes: “ethics is not an ensemble of constituted values and principles; it is the 
constituting movement through which values and principles are posited; it is 
the movement that an authentically moral man must reproduce for himself.”13 
To be free is to act in the face of limitations. It is to transcend the given world. 
Like Hume’s conception of man as an inventive species, Beauvoir argues that 
in the presence of adversity and collective action problems, mankind creates, 
maintains, and alters customs, norms, and meanings to better serve its needs. 
Rather than clinging to a particular set of moral ideals or realist beliefs about 
the world,
“since the political man14 cannot avoid questioning himself about the 
justification for his actions, and since a politics is not valid unless its ends are 
freely chosen, ethics and politics seem one and the same to us […] Reconciling 
ethics and politics is thus reconciling man with himself; it means affirming that 
at every instant he can assume himself totally.”15
Similar to Hume’s assertion that people support property rights in the 
expectation that they will benefit from them, in one of her earlier philosophical 
essays, “An Eye for an Eye” (1946), Beauvoir writes that the “metaphysical 
basis for the idea of justice” is the “affirmation of the reciprocity of interhuman 
relations.”16 For Hume, the essential reciprocal interhuman relation necessary 
for justice is the protection of property rights. For Beauvoir, because people are 
free, and because justice is dependent on reciprocity, the main concern is the 
13  Simone de Beauvoir, “Moral Idealism and Political Realism” in Simone de Beauvoir: 
Philosophical Writings (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 188.
14  The political man is understood not as a mere politician or “political technician”, but as one who 
“intends to map out the world to come” or “who has the audacity to choose his ends and to reach them 
without allowing taboos to get in the way” (“Moral Idealism”, 189, 187). 
15  Simone de Beauvoir, “Moral Idealism”, 189.
16  Simone de Beauvoir, “An Eye for an Eye” in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 249.
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ability of people to use their freedom equally. Though this may never be fully 
actualized, it is still a worthwhile end. This is why Beauvoir writes in Pyrrhus 
and Cineas (1944) that “Our freedoms support each other like the stones in an 
arch, but in an arch that no pillars support”.17 In order for me to be free, you 
must also be free—an equality of freedom is necessary. Property rights are not 
sufficient for the establishment of this idea of justice.
Beauvoir addresses the importance of self-interest in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity when she writes that “no moral question presents itself to the child 
as long as he is still incapable of recognizing himself in the past or seeing 
himself in the future”.18 In other words, individuals must be able to see and 
recognize their self-interest in order for a sense of morality to arise in them. 
If they do not recognize themselves as ends, worthy of pursuing, Beauvoir 
suggests that individuals would have no sense of moral or immoral behavior. 
Moral behavior, for Beauvoir, is intimately linked with individuals being treated 
as ends in themselves. This thought extends to sympathy. If one does not see 
others as ends worthy of their own pursuits then one cannot treat them morally. 
This ability to see another person as a project in its own right is what Beauvoir 
suggests is moving about a child’s face. She writes, “it is not that the child is 
more moving or that he has more of a right to happiness than the others: it is 
that he is the living affirmation of human transcendence: he is on the watch, he 
is an eager hand held out to the world, he is a hope, a project” (EA110). Those 
who fail to see others as projects and instead see them as mere means to their 
own ends are tyrants, she says (EA110).
“[Man] can become conscious of the real requirements of his own 
freedom, which can will itself only by destining itself to an open future, by 
seeking to extend itself by means of the freedom of others. Therefore, in any 
case, the freedom of other men must be respected and they must be helped 
to free themselves” (EA65). Though she recognizes that it is natural to be 
more sympathetic to oppression that affects a person or those close to him, 
Beauvoir suggests that even so, “through his own struggle he must seek to 
serve the universal cause of freedom” (EA96). Indeed, according to Beauvoir, 
“no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the 
existence of others. The idea of such dependence is frightening” (EA72). While 
people are able to act and create, they are also dependent on others to act and 
create in ways that do not oppose or oppress others. 
17  Simone de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus and Cineas, in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 140. Hereafter cited in the text by the letters PC and 
page number.
18  Simone De Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’Ambiguité (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). Hereafter cited 
in the text by the letters EA and page number from the English edition, The Ethics of Ambiguity, tr. B. 
Fruchtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), here at 27.
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Unlike Hume, in The Ethics of Ambiguity Beauvoir has little to say about 
property, and what she does say is all negative. She agrees with Hume that 
property regimes are human inventions. But the ones we have are not just ones. 
“Conservatives” who defend the present distribution of wealth try to present it 
as a “natural fact” but the revolutionaries recognize that “the present regime is 
a human fact” (EA89). The property associated with the Parti Républicain de la 
Liberté is based on the exploitation of the working class and thus is not freedom 
for everyone but rather only freedom for a few (EA96). It is a “freedom which 
is interested only in denying freedom” (EA97). 
Beauvoir finds that it is precisely because of various sorts of ambiguity that 
we have freedom. Like Hume, she takes issue with the idea that either the mind 
or the body is supreme. She asserts that all men feel the ambiguity of body and 
mind, and accuses philosophers of trying to obscure this ambiguity. Philosophers 
have “striven to reduce mind to matter, or to reabsorb matter into mind, or to 
merge them within a single substance” (EA7). She observes that most who have 
tried to ignore this ambiguity and create an ethics have fallen into one of two 
camps. One is focused purely inwardly, the other purely externally. One either 
closes oneself off from the real world, or loses oneself in the world (EA6). For 
Beauvoir, if one is concerned with morality, one cannot simply focus internally 
and morality cannot be known from reason alone. Like Hume, she takes issue 
with the idea that morals are learned from reason. That position suggests that 
mind is supreme over matter or the body. She also takes issue with the idea that 
the body reigns over the mind, and insists that it is important to recognize that 
both are influential and have their own role in the development of morality and 
ethics. This ambiguity creates an opening for freedom. The general argument is 
that we can choose between ambiguous choices. And our inventiveness grows 
out of that. Or in other words, ambiguity makes freedom possible.
Similar to Hume’s view that mankind is an inventive species, Beauvoir 
recognizes the role of man’s creative abilities in constructing the world in 
which he inhabits. Of man, Beauvoir writes, “he bears the responsibility for 
a world which is not the work of a strange power, but of himself, where his 
defeats are inscribed, and his victories as well” (EA15). She continues, “one 
can not start by saying that our earthly destiny has or has not importance, for 
it depends upon us to give it importance” (EA15). But this power of invention 
is not limitless. Rather, she asserts that man does not freely create the world, 
but that “the will [of man] is defined only by raising obstacles, and by the 
contingency of facticity certain obstacles let themselves be conquered, and 
others do not” (EA28). This is another aspect of what she sees as the ambiguous 
nature of man. “The more widespread their mastery of the world, the more they 
find themselves crushed by uncontrollable forces. Though they are masters of 
the atomic bomb, yet it is created only to destroy them” (EA7).
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Beauvoir sees this ability to invent, form, and influence the world as 
central to what it means to be human. The condition of man is freedom and that 
is also man’s ultimate end even though we live in a situation which at times 
severely limits our freedom. Though Beauvoir believes freedom is central to the 
condition of man, she also recognizes that this is hidden from some. She writes, 
“this misfortune which comes to man as a result of the fact that he was a child 
is that his freedom was first concealed from him and that all his life he will be 
nostalgic for the time when he did not know its exigencies” (EA43). Man often 
feels as though he is not free and not able to influence the world around him. 
Many of the horrors of the world are a result of man’s complicity in choosing 
not to act. By this rejection of freedom, man is therefore responsible for not 
protesting the ways in which others are subjugated (EA40-41). For Beauvoir, 
it is important to recognize our power and ability to influence the world around 
us—even if that influence and ability to act is limited. As she writes, “to be free 
is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the 
given toward an open future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my 
situation and is even the condition of my own freedom” (EA97). This latter 
gives a reason for acting: one’s own freedom is enhanced by the freedom of 
others. Perhaps this is also a type of enlightened self-interest.
Of course, acting to free others in order to free oneself is a possible 
description of Hume’s view of property. In the abstract, everyone gets more 
freedom from violence if the rules of property are respected. If Beauvoir were 
more of a Humean, she might have argued that our own freedom is enhanced by 
the property of others. But in property regimes as we know them, not everyone 
has equal property and not everyone is equally free, and the freedom that many 
should have is hidden from them. With this kind of critique, Beauvoir could 
draw attention to the fact that there is no mention in Hume of problems with 
great disparities of property, nor of people as property (slaves and women). 
Thus, Hume could be missing the point, as Molly Farneth writes, that “if 
existential freedom entails contributing to the ongoing process of remaking 
the social world, then one person’s freedom entails all people’s freedom” and 
his complacency about property rules “impedes others’ freedom to remake the 
world by guarding the inherited world from challenge.”19 He seems to be taking 
certain elements of the world to be facts which cannot be altered or changed. 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity Beauvoir also recognizes the fact that in many 
circumstances women have been kept in a position where they are apt to accept 
and even rely on their positions of subservience. She writes that women and 
slaves are “beings whose life slips by in an infantile world because, having 
been kept in a state of servitude and ignorance, they have no means of breaking 
19  Molly Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone de Beauvoir, and the ‘New Vocabulary’ of Existentialist 
Ethics,” Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 96, 2013, 177.
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the ceiling which is stretched over their heads. Like the child, they can exercise 
their freedom, but only within this universe which has been set up before them, 
without them” (EA39). For many women, the world around them is one which 
has been formed by men, for men. Women exist in the world, but it is not a 
world made with them in mind. While some recognize this neglect of women 
and think of it as despicable, other women, Beauvoir suggests, “take shelter 
in the shadow of men; they adopt without discussion the opinions and values 
recognized by their husband or their lover, and that allow them to develop 
childish qualities which are forbidden to adults because they are based on a 
feeling of irresponsibility” (EA40)..Though Beauvoir recognizes that some, 
such as slaves, are in a position in which they truly do not choose to be complicit 
in their subjugation, others, such as some women in the western world in the 
modern era, are complicit in their own subjugation.
It is well known that Beauvoir’s most influential contribution to twentieth 
century political philosophy was The Second Sex.20 In this volume her analysis 
of the status of women is much more developed and nuanced. One element of 
the subjugation of the female sex is the institution of property: “it is the social 
regime founded on private property that brought about the married woman’s 
wardship” (SS149). Of the tension between man and woman, Beauvoir writes, 
“Everything he wins, he wins against her; the more powerful he becomes, the 
more she declines. In particular, when he acquires ownership of land, he also 
claims woman as property. Formerly he was possessed by the mana, by the 
earth: now he has a soul, property; freed from Woman, he now lays claim to 
a woman and a posterity of his own” (SS87). As women have historically 
often been kept from certain kinds of employment that would allow them 
to live without depending on a man, and because they have also sometimes 
been kept from owning private property, the life and subjugation of women 
is entwined with the existence of private property and inheritance. Beauvoir 
writes that, “because she owns nothing, woman is not raised to the dignity of 
a person; she herself is a part of man’s patrimony, first her father’s and then 
her husband’s” (SS204). Most women have been kept in a position of being 
unable to own private property since its advent. Because of this, according to 
Beauvoir, women are seen as being less than full moral beings, and in fact, 
property of men.
As we have seen, Hume discusses property in general and in abstraction, 
such that it could be referring to any sort of property, private, communal, or 
state. We have seen that in one of her books she criticizes one form of private 
property, but one should note that a Beauvoirian would also have to recognize 
20  Simone de Beauvoir. Le Deuxième Sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949) Hereinafter cited in the text by 
the letters SS and by page number from the English edition, The Second Sex, tr. Constance Borde and 
Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage Books, 2009).
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the limits or failures of communal and state property as bases for justice in 
society.  
Regarding communal property, we shall focus on several aspects of 
Beauvoir’s discussion of Sparta. Beauvoir suggests that in Sparta—a society in 
which community property prevailed—women were treated “almost as the equal 
of man” (SS96). Beauvoir even suggests that Plato “aspiring to a communal 
regime, promised women a similar autonomy to that enjoyed in Sparta” 
(SS130). However, while Beauvoir believes Spartan women were somewhat 
more equal to men as a result of a society based on communal property, she 
also recognizes that male oppression was still prevalent (SS66). She claims 
that in societies such as Sparta and Nazi Germany in which women were made 
less erotic, but more dependent on the state, women had “both more and less 
autonomy than a bourgeois woman living under a capitalist regime” (SS146). 
So Beauvoir recognizes both the benefits and the drawbacks of societies based 
on communal property such as Sparta. A Beauvoirian could argue that this 
suggests that merely changing from private property to communal property 
rights would not guarantee justice as it does not recognize the issues of women 
and address them adequately.
The same argument can be made for state property. What Beauvoir said 
about the Soviet Union provides some insight into why a Beauvoirian would 
also suggest that justice cannot be attained merely by securing property 
rights for the state. Beauvoir suggests the goal of a socialist society would 
be the elimination of the distinction between men and women, and the 
recognition of individuals only as workers (SS64). Beauvoir argues that this 
sentiment was present in Lenin’s thought, which linked women’s liberation 
to the liberation of workers. He aimed or desired to give them political and 
economic equality (SS147). Though this may be the goal of the creation and 
protection of state property, Beauvoir also recognizes that patriarchy was 
never eliminated from the USSR. She observed that patriarchy in marriage 
practices, the eroticization of women, as well as other aspects of the ways in 
which the USSR chose to organize its economy and property did not lead to 
the liberation of women (SS67).   
In both the creation of communal and state property rights, women have 
been relegated in many ways to second class citizenship. In these instances, 
rather than being an end in herself, woman in society is merely seen as an 
instrument or tool for stable property practices. This continues to be the case 
when Beauvoir discusses private property. According to Beauvoir, the need for 
the male sex to protect its possessions is in part responsible for the tradition 
of marriage as well as the belief that infidelity on the part of women is a high 
crime. She states that “Marriage rites were originally intended to protect man 
against woman; she becomes his property […]” (SS204). In part, what man 
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could need “protection” from could be the infidelity of women, as Hume’s 
discussion of women suggests. In order to keep men true and faithful to their 
families, they must believe that their children are indeed their own, in both 
private property and communal property regimes. In other words, when only 
men may own property, women are used as a means of maintaining the stable 
possession and transfer of property rather than as ends in themselves. Because 
of this Beauvoir writes,
“As long as private property lasts, conjugal infidelity on the part of a woman is 
considered a crime of high treason […] under the patriarchal regime, she was 
the property of a father who married her off as he saw fit; then attached to her 
husband’s household, she was no more than his thing and the thing of the family 
(genos) in which she was placed” (SS91). 
Though Hume believes property is the heart of the artifice of justice, 
Beauvoir’s account implies that it cannot be totally just if it is dependent upon 
the idea of subjugation and domination of women.
The critique is that while Hume believes the protection of property is 
the major element of justice, the way in which this artifice has come about 
throughout history has been at the expense of women, for reasons that Hume 
does not adequately explain or defend. This could be in part because of the 
fact that, as Sonia Kruks interprets Beauvoir’s critique of Engels, “it is only 
given certain already-existing values, including the desire to dominate the 
other, that the development of private property could have facilitated women’s 
subordination”.21 Thus Beauvoir believes that the paternity-based reason for 
the control of women is not the whole story. There must also be a desire to 
dominate the other prior to this concern. So while Hough suggests there is 
hope for Hume’s philosophy to be supportive of women due to its discussion 
and focus on sympathy, it appears as though his idea of justice is still rooted in 
impressions and desires which seek to subjugate women to men.22 Though this 
subjugation may produce order and stability as Hume believes it does, one must 
ask whether this conception of the basis and invention of justice is truly just.
If it is true that property rights are the origin of justice, then perhaps one 
could say Beauvoir could be a Humean in the advocacy of property rights as 
long as they are extended to men and women equally. Beauvoirians could, in 
theory, agree that justice arose from property. However, they would also argue 
that it must move beyond that. Extending property rights to women has made 
women’s situation better—even if they originated as sexist tools to control 
and oppress women. Though property rights in and of themselves can still be 
seen as problematic, that does not have to mean that women should not enjoy 
21  Sonia Kruks, “Ambiguity and Certitude in Simone de Beauvoir’s Politics”, PMLA, 124, 2009, 217.
22  Hough, “Humean Androgynes”, 236.
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their benefits, whether or not they benefit women to the same degree as they 
benefit men. However, Hume’s conception of justice based in the protection of 
property is still too narrow. Protecting property, as Hume suggests, may help in 
some ways, but is not the panacea he may have believed it to be. 
Protecting property does not account for the ways in which women’s 
situatedness necessitates more particular requirements for justice. Among those 
concerns Beauvoir feels would create equality between men and women are: 
women should receive the exact same education as men and have identical 
working conditions and salaries; women would be obliged to work; marriage 
would be freely engaged in and freely broken; birth control and abortion would 
be legal; maternity leave would be provided by society—but this does not mean 
that children are taken from their parents nor that children are abandoned to 
their parents (SS760). From this list, it is clear that even if Beauvoir were in 
favor of extending property rights to women—even if it were to the fullest 
extent as men—Hume’s conception of justice would still be left wanting. It is 
not bad to extend property rights to women, according to Beauvoir, but it is 
incomplete.  
Justice based in the protection of property does not fully recognize the ways 
in which the freedom of women has been curtailed in society. The differences 
between men and women, both biological and sociological, according to 
Beauvoir, mean that in order to be equal in society—i.e. to be able to act equally 
freely—these differences must be taken into account. One cannot simply bring 
women into the fold of pre-existing conceptions of justice based in property 
rights and expect society to be just. One must also take the differences between 
men and women and explicitly conceptualize how to mitigate the effects of 
those differences so that men and women can truly live more equally and thus 
more justly. As Beauvoir writes, “To demand for woman all the rights, all the 
possibilities of the human being in general does not mean one must be blind 
to her singular situation” (SS67). By recognizing and accounting for these 
differences, as well as trying to mitigate the adverse effects, men and women 
can move beyond the explicit and implicit oppression of women and instead 
“unequivocally affirm their brotherhood” (SS766). 
Though Beauvoir is opposed to tyrannical government just as Hume is, 
her text is more nuanced in the way it recognizes that not only is broad systemic 
justice important, but so, too, is individual ethics. In fact, one could see that 
while systemic injustice is abhorrent, opposing a tyrannical system may not do 
much if individuals are not compelled to change their behavior as well. One must 
be able to bring about meaningful change. After all, if people do not recognize 
that it is one’s ethical responsibility to fight for the freedom of themselves and 
others, how would one expect there to be opposition to tyrannical regimes in 
the first place? Beauvoir writes, “Ethics is the triumph over facticity” (EA48). 
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We are all limited in different ways, but when we act and create in ways that 
empower ourselves and others to rise above our circumstances, to see ourselves 
and others as ends, we are ethical. 
Though Hume’s text asserts that morality and justice are man-made, he 
does not insist on the ability, or requirement, of man to see one’s life as an 
individual project—part of which is to fight for the freedom of others. Rather, 
Hume suggests that it is necessary that we “know our rank and station in 
the world, whether it be fix’d by our birth, fortune, employments, talents 
or reputation. ‘Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and passion and pride in 
conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly” (382). Beauvoir has 
a broader notion or understanding of oppression in the world than is evident 
in this observation of Hume. While she would certainly agree that there can 
be value gained from understanding one’s place in the world, this does not 
mean that one necessarily must “regulate our actions accordingly.” Rather, 
it seems evident that Beauvoir in many, if not most, circumstances would 
argue that people have an obligation to themselves and others to rise up 
and stand in opposition to what is expected of them—whether it be women, 
slaves, or the proletariat. Michèle le Doeuff writes that, “When Simone de 
Beauvoir describes the repetitive nature of housework, when she analyzes 
the censorious treatment of aggressiveness in little girls, when she sets out 
notions on female frigidity, when she examines the prevailing conception of 
women’s wages as ‘salaire d’appoint’ supplementing the husband’s earnings, 
she provides essential elements of a detailed and precise consciousness 
of women’s oppression.”23 As we have suggested, Beauvoir has a broader 
view of oppression than Hume, which would then insist that it is not just 
in the face of government tyranny that one must rise and oppose injustice. 
Beauvoir would not be surprised that Hume and others do not see the above 
mentioned ways in which women are oppressed as oppression. For as le 
Doeuff writes, “she can see oppression where the dominant discourse says 
there is protection, or seduction, or, worse, duty.”24 Rather, injustice should 
be sought out, interrogated, and attacked wherever one finds it, whether in 
the government, work place, or even nuclear family. Hume did not mention 
injustices or inequalities of power within the family, for example. On the 
topic of the family, Church writes,
The family is the origin of society, but it is also a microcosm of it. Parents 
establish general rules of moral behavior both to regulate family life, but also 
to prepare their children for success in civil society. Society itself has a number 
of mores by which we must regulate our behavior so as to attain success and 
praise with our honor and wit. The market and the regime set down certain laws 
23  Michèle Le Doeuff, “Simone de Beauvoir and Existentialism”, Feminist Studies, 6, 1980, 277.
24  Le Doeuff, “Simone de Beauvoir…”, 279.
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which we must obey in order to maintain a thriving business or get reelected 
into office.25 
Others, such as Susan Moller Okin, would argue that this is problematic 
because the way the nuclear family is commonly structured is itself not just. 
Okin writes that “the sexual division of labor within the family, in particular, is 
not only a fundamental part of the marriage contract, but so deeply influences 
us in our most formative years that feminists of both sexes who try to reject 
it find themselves struggling against it with varying degrees of ambivalence. 
Based on this linchpin, the deeply entrenched social institutionalization of sex 
difference, which I will refer to as ‘the gender system’ or simply ‘gender,’ still 
permeates our society”.26 This sentiment is similar to Beauvoir, who throughout 
her work discusses the ways in which at every turn women are subjugated to 
men, both in the family and in turn in society at large. Just as one may ask after 
reading Beauvoir how one can have valid system of justice based on property 
when women have been historically excluded from owning property and also 
treated as property, one may also ask how a system can be just if the idea of 
justice began in the household, which itself is often unjust? But, of course, 
if women are allowed to own property, and families become egalitarian, this 
objection would disappear.
It is true that Hume does not seem to be overly concerned with differences 
in power in the development of morals and other human artifices. If it is true 
that they are man-made, it is not true that all men have the ability to equally 
influence and change these rules and customs. Hume writes as if all are equal 
when he observes that “I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any 
real kindness; because I forsee, that he will return my service, in expectation of 
another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of 
good offices with me or with others” (371). As a methodological individualist 
in this instance, the method by which an individual learns social norms and 
expectations is discussed as if the two individuals are on a completely equal 
footing. While it is true that in some circumstances this may be the case, 
Hume does not seem at any point to adequately deal with the fact that in most 
known societies some, or even most, people are kept in a position in which 
their behavior is futile. Alhough man is an inventive species, not every man is 
given the opportunity to exercise the ability to invent in society. Hume briefly 
touches on the ways in which women have been controlled by men, but that 
brief section does not do justice to the importance of differing power relations 
in society. This topic is by no means the exclusive point of Beauvoir’s work, 
but the position of child-like subservience in parts of the population such as 
women and slaves is more openly acknowledged by her than by Hume. 
25  Church, “Selfish and Moral Politics”, 176.
26  Susan Moller Okin, “Justice and Gender”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16, 1987, 42.
439Property and Freedom: A Beauvoirian Critique 
of Hume’s Theory of Justice and a Humean Answer
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 20, nº 40. 
Segundo semestre de 2018. Pp. 421-445.  ISSN 1575-6823  e-ISSN 2340-2199  doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2018.i40.19
Though insisting that existential ethics is an ethics in which one is only 
truly free when others are free may sound idealistic and devoid of “real world” 
concerns of power, Beauvoir does explain that in some cases, killing another 
individual may be necessary. Beauvoir writes, “When a young sixteen-year 
old Nazi died crying, ‘Heil Hitler!’ he was not guilty, and it was not he whom 
we hated but his masters. The desirable thing would be to re-educate this 
misled youth […] But the urgency of the struggle forbids this slow labor. We 
are obliged to destroy not only the oppressor but also those who serve him, 
whether they do so out of ignorance or out of constraint” (EA105). Beauvoir 
also says that Hegel, Stalin, and the fascists are wrong to claim that group 
rights override individual rights. “A doctrine which aims at the liberation of 
man evidently can not rest on a contempt for the individual” (EA111) and the 
theory that says that one should willingly sacrifice oneself for the group is 
“self-contesting” (EA112). She asserts that “the collectivist conception of man 
does not concede a valid existence to such sentiments as love, tenderness, and 
friendship” (EA116). This means that “the defender of the U.S.S.R. is making 
use of a fallacy when he unconditionally justifies the sacrifices and the crimes 
by the ends pursued” (EA158). Rather, he should recognize the ambiguities and 
uncertainties of any political commitment (EA159). For Beauvoir, that is not 
a bad thing: it is ambiguity which allows for freedom. It was brave of her to 
admit in mid-1940’s Paris that Stalin was sometimes wrong.
Beauvoir would have to admit that the protection of property rights—
private, communal, and state—has led to greater stability, order, and peace in 
society, as Hume suggested. While protection of property may be necessary for 
justice in society, she would say it is not sufficient. This has been suggested 
by the ways in which Beauvoir finds that in different social structures that rest 
on different forms of property, there is still oppression—of women as well as 
other groups. These societies may be orderly, but they may not be just. Rather, 
Beauvoir’s description of justice being based in the reciprocity of interhuman 
relations makes clear that justice is dependent on much more than protection 
of property. This basis for justice, along with the central themes at the core of 
much of Beauvoir’s philosophy, suggest that rather than property, justice is 
secured when individuals are seen as ends by themselves as well as others. For 
this to occur, people must aspire to not only ensure their own freedom, but the 
freedom of others.
3. A Humean critique of Beauvoir
The Ethics of Ambiguity and most of Beauvoir’s other early philosophical 
writings are all about freedom and choices, with no significant attention to 
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property rights. Their implicit critique of the Humean theory of justice for 
underplaying the importance of inequalities of property and of property in 
people is probably well-taken. But a Humean could push back, saying that 
property is still the most important element of justice, and that those inequalities 
can be fixed. Hume could certainly agree with Beauvoir when she wrote that 
“the task of man is one: to fashion the world by giving it meaning”.27 That 
sounds like Humean invention. But what sort of meaning? How will violence 
be suppressed, or will we just have to live with it? Beauvoir’s formula provides 
no clues about the answers to these questions, while Hume’s reliance on the 
invention of property spells out some answers. In the following, we will 
develop some of these Humean answers as a critique of Beauvoir. We do not 
mean to say that this is what Hume did in fact say, but that someone who takes 
up Hume’s insistence on the importance of property rights in the making of 
justice could make these arguments.
Since Hume’s argument is mostly abstract and philosophical, we can 
expand on it by relying on another abstract and generalizing philosopher. 
Lawrence C. Becker’s exploration of the philosophical foundations of property 
rights distinguishes those foundations into several categories. One of them is 
the argument from utility. This argument points out that we could not do much 
in the way of carrying out our purposes of any type if we do not have reliable 
access to tools and materials.28 Beauvoir writes about freedom as if freedom does 
not depend on property rights, but at this point the Humean could ask Beauvoir 
how she thinks people could carry out their purposes without property rights? 
What is freedom if it does not include carrying out our purposes? What choices 
could you make in Beauvoir’s vaunted situations of ambiguity in conditions of 
complete instability of property?  
A second utility of property is that the acquisition, possession, and 
use of things may be necessary for the creation of personality.29 Beauvoir 
is very much into individuals making choices, but does she realize that the 
phenomenological basis of individuals as we know them is their property? 
The Humean could insist that you cannot think of yourself as an independent 
individual if you do not have some property that is safe from the control or 
even violence of others.That there can be no justice without property is a 
strong, but very Humean, point.
A subset of personality development is the development of the child. As 
we have seen, Beauvoir is very interested in the phenomenology of the child. 
Doesn’t the child also need to think of things that are mine in order to have the 
27  Simone de Beauvoir, “What is Existentialism?” (1947) in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical 
Writings (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 325.
28  Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1977), 62.
29  Becker, Property Rights, 63.
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self-respect it needs to see itself as an end? Can we develop full personalities 
while thinking that everything outside of our bodies is beyond our control? 
At the least, that would be a different personality than any we have yet seen. 
Even if it is not beyond the inventiveness of human nature to develop such a 
personality, are we sure we want to? There may be unintended consequences. 
If everything outside of our bodies is outside of our control, it might be difficult 
to continue to think that our bodies are under our own control. 
One of the arguments for property rights is the argument from political 
liberty. It centers on the point that the effective prohibition of human beings’ 
desires to acquire things and control them and exclude others from their use 
would require a comprehensive and continuous abridgment of people’s liberty.30 
No property, no liberty, could be the Humean’s slogan.     
The Humean does not need to reject Beauvoir’s criticisms entirely. He 
or she could answer that Hume was only sketching the largest principles, and 
that none of them would prevent us from getting the details of property right: 
great disparities and property in people could certainly be prohibited. It is true 
that Hume defends the requirement that a poor man return a pledge to a rich 
one as a general principle (308ff). But that does not rule out exceptions, among 
other things in cases of necessity. It does rule out that across the board anybody 
who borrows anything can decide whether to return it based upon needs and 
deservingness at that time. But if that were the standard for loans, and we were 
constantly reevaluating returns of borrowed items, what would happen? Would 
anybody loan anything?
It is true that Hume does not say anything about the need for some level 
of equality of property ownership in the Treatise. But in his rewriting of his 
theory for more popular consumption in the Enquiry concerning the Principles 
of Morals he imagines the case of living with some creatures who “though 
rational, were possessed of such inferior strength of body and mind, that they 
were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, 
make us feel the effects of their resentment” and concludes that in such a case 
we would not “properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard 
to them, nor could they possess any right or property” (191).31 The logic here is 
that property is an implicit agreement for mutual restraint, and if one side could 
not take the other’s property or stop the other from taking theirs, there would 
be no reason for restraint on the side of the other. On the one hand, this could 
sound like a justification for robbery and cruelty, but on the other hand it may be 
Hume’s way of claiming that the remedy here is not justice, but rather that we 
“should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage” (191)32. This 
30  Becker, Property Rights, 63.
31  David Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, Third Edition, 1975), 191.   
32  Ibid.
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may be a way of saying that justice narrowly construed is only about respecting 
the rules of property, but that the laws of humanity can do much more.
If it may be true that Hume’s account of justice as property is complacent 
in some respects, it may also be true that Beauvoir’s account of freedom is 
complacent in its own way. Recall that Hume’s chief concern is diminishing 
violence in human society. Beauvoir does not seem so concerned. In Pyrrhus 
and Cineas she recognizes that violence is common because man covets the 
goods of others (PC94) and is divided and in conflict with himself (PC138). 
She attempts to lessen our opposition to violence on the ground that in one 
sense it is not an evil (PC138). Violence creates slavery, but, for example, 
slavery doesn’t change the freedom of the slave (PC124). On the other hand, 
as we have seen, she also recognizes that some who have been “kept in a 
state of servitude and ignorance, […] have no means of breaking the ceiling 
which is stretched over their heads” (EA39). Thus, while all people are free, 
some are better able to make use of their freedom than others. If we value 
our own freedom, she argues, we must fight to further the freedom of others. 
And she also points out that violence can destroy the very freedom that she 
favors (PC137). A Humean would say she should recognize the importance of 
property in preventing this violence. The Humean could indeed recognize that 
there is a lot about inventiveness in her account, but object that it is all about 
the individual holding on to inventiveness even in difficult circumstances. But 
the Humean would argue that we also need something more systematic than 
individualism in the face of violence.
Annette Baier’s portrait of Hume’s philosophy makes him into a more 
sympathetic thinker for modern purposes. She thinks he would have supported 
the North in the American Civil War and the civil rights movement in the 
United States (54). She writes of his support for the Levellers in the English 
Civil War (62) and his opposition to slavery and the exclusion of women from 
owning property (81, 111). Her assertion that “Hume recognizes a right to 
rebel against tyrannical rulers, but not against unfair or oppressive property 
conventions” can be answered by observing that he simply did not raise the 
issue (52). Insisting that property rules are of overriding importance does not 
imply that unfair ones are acceptable. Her list of what justice can include that 
goes beyond property such as “fair trials, fair return on labor, a fair chance at 
some station in life, a fair account of one’s character” may in fact be matters of 
property in important ways (97-98). So a more egalitarian conclusion may be 
founded on the importance of property than perhaps some people might realize. 
Maybe Hume’s justice as property and Beauvoir’s equal freedom are both 
elements of a prior and higher goal of human inventiveness aimed at humanity. 
Does it make a difference whether equal rights are defined as property rights or 
a matter of freedom, or as a matter of humanity? Only if justice and freedom 
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are somehow considered more important or more fundamental than humanity. 
But are they? Why are justice or freedom the most important thing? Maybe 
humanity is more important. In that case, Hume’s theory of justice is just a 
theory of property which aims to do no more or no less than take care of the 
problems that are created by instability of property and Simone of Beauvoir’s 
concerns with freedom are no more and no less than a vindication of freedom 
in contexts of ambiguity. And both are components of humanity.
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